In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. The complexity of manipulating realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant was recently studied [4], but the emphasis was on the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant number of candidates. That work, in many cases, left open the question: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when comparing the relative manipulability of different voting protocols. In this paper we answer that question for the voting protocols of the earlier study: plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, regular cup, and randomized cup. We also answer that question for two voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of manipulation have been derived before: veto and plurality with runoff. It turns out that the voting protocols under study become hard to manipulate at 3 candidates, 4 candidates, 7 candidates, or never.
Under certain restrictions, such as single-peaked preferences or quasilinear preferences, nomnanipulable protocols exist (e.g. [12, 6, 7] ). The weakness of this approach is that in practice the protocol designer cannot be sure that the agents' preferences fall within the restriction. If they do not, it is impossible to vote truthfully, so the protocol forces the agents to manipulate. A second approach to avoiding manipulation is randomization. For example, a dictator could be chosen at random among the voters, in which case there would be no incentive for manipulation. The randomization approach is undesirable if it introduces too much noise into the election process, and it turns out that almost complete randomization (as in the example above) is required in order to obtain a nonmanipulable protocol [9, 10] . Furthermore, randomization can introduce manipulation possibilities even when none would have existed (for the preferences that the agents happen to have) under a deterministic protocol [15] .
We take a third tack toward avoiding manipulation: ensuring that finding a beneficial manipulation is so hard computationally that it is unlikely that voters will be able to manipulate. So, unlike in most of computer science, here high computational complexity is a desirable property. The harder it is to manipulate, the better. Especially in the context of software agents, this computational complexity is best measured with the usual tools from theoretical computer science. The approach of using computational complexity to avoid manipulation has not received much attention and many problems are still open. Bartholdi et al. prove some hardness results under the assumption that not only the number of voters but also the number of candidates is unbounded [2, 1] . Such results do not prove hardness of manipulation in real elections where the number of candidates is small. Conitzer and Sandholm addressed this issue by studying the complexity of manipulation when the number of candidates is a constant [4] . The emphasis in that work was on the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant number of candidates. This, in many cases, left open the question:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when comparing the relative manipulability of different voting protocols.
In this paper we answer that question for the voting protocols of the earlier study: plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, regular cup, and randomized cup. We also answer that question for two voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of manipulation have been derived before: veto and plurality with runoff. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review standard voting protocols. In Section 3 we present definitions of manipulation. The core of the paper is Section 4 where we present our results on the complexity of manipulation. Conclusions and future research are discussed in Section 5.
Voting protocols
We now define the voting setting. Let V = {vl,... ,vn} be the finite set of voters. Let X = {1,... ,m} be the finite set of candidates. The preferences of voter vi are given by a linear order Oi on ,~' . A preference profile is a vector P = (O1 .... , On) of individual preferences.
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A voting protocol is a function from the set of all preference profiles to the set of candidates X .1
The following list reviews the most common voting protocols. In the protocols that are based on scores, the candidate with the highest score wins. In each of the listed protocols (even the ones that have multiple rounds), the voters submit their preferences up front. That is, the voters are not allowed to change their preference revelations during the execution of the protocol.
• scoring protocols. Let ~ = (al .... , c~m) be a vector of integers such that c~1 _> c~2... > am. For each voter, a candidate receives c~1 points if it is ranked first by the voter, o~2 if it is ranked second etc. The score sa of a candidate is the total number of points the candidate receives. The Borda protocol is the scoring protocol with ff = (m -1, m -2,... , 0>. The plurality protocol (aka. majority rule) is the scoring protocol with ~ = (1, 0,... , 0>. The veto protocol is the scoring protocol with a= <1,1,... ,1,0).
• maximin (akin Simpson). For any two distinct candidates i and j, let N(i,j) be the number of voters who prefer i to j. The maximin score of i is s(i) = minj~i N(i,j).
• Copeland. For any two distinct candidates i and j, let C(i,j) = +1 if N(i,j) > N(j,i) (in this case we say that i beats j in their pairwise election),
• single transferable vote (STV). The protocol proceeds through a series of m -1 rounds. At each round, the candidate with the lowest plurality score (i.e., the least number of voters ranking it first among the remaining candidates) is eliminated. The winner is the last remaining candidate.
• plurality with run-off. In this protocol, a first round eliminates all candidates except the two with the highest plurality scores. Then votes are transferred to these (as in the STV protocol). After that, a second round determines the winner among these two.
• cup (sequential binary comparisons). The cup is defined by a balanced binary tree T with one leaf per candidate, and an assignment of candidates to leaves (each leaf gets one candidate). Each non-leaf node is assigned the winner of the pairwise election of the node's children; the candidate assigned to the root wins. The regular cup protocol assumes that the assignment of candidates to leaves is known by the voters before they vote. In the randomized cup protocol [4] , the assignment of candidates to leaves is chosen uniformly at random after the voters have voted. Note that the randomized cup protocol differs from all the other protocols under discussion in the sense that all the others are deterministic.
In some settings, the voters are weighted. A weight function is a mapping w : V ~ N*. When voters are weighted, the above protocols are applied by simply considering a voter of weight k to be k different voters. Different possible interpretations can be given to weights. They may represent the decision power of a given agent in a voting setting where not all agents are considered equal. The weight may correspond to the size of the community that the voter represents (such as the size of the state). Or, 1Some of the voting protocols require tie-breaking rules (at different stages of the execution of the protocol). These rules are usually left undefined. The results in this paper do not depend on tie-breaking rules. when agents vote in partisan groups (e.g., in parliament), the weights may correspond to the size of the group (each group acts as one voter).
3 M a n i p u l a t i n g a n e l e c t i o n In this section we define our computational problem precisely. We lead into the definition by discussing the different dimensions of the election manipulation problem: 1) What information do the manipulators have about the nonmanipulators' votes? In the incomplete information setting, the manipulators are uncertain about the nonmanipulators' votes. This uncertainty could be represented in a number of ways, for example, as a joint probability distribution over the nonmanipulators' votes. In the complete information setting, the manipulators know the nonmanipulators' votes exactly. We prove our results for the complete information case for the following reasons: la. It is a special case of any uncertainty model. Therefore, our hardness results directly imply hardness for the incomplete information setting, lb. Via prior results of Conitzer and Sandholm [4] , hardness results for manipulation by coalitions in the complete information setting also imply hardness of manipulation by individuals in the incomplete information setting. (We will discuss these implications in more detail in the conclusions section of this paper.) 2. Results in the complete information setting measure only the inherent complexity of manipulation rather than any potential complexity introduced by the model of uncertainty.
2) Who is manipulating: an individual voter or a coalition of voters? Both of these are important variants, but we focus on coalitional manipulation for the following reasons: 1. In elections with many voters it is very unlikely that an individual voter can affect the outcome even with unlimited computational power. 2. For any constant number of candidates (even with an unbounded number of voters), manipulation by individuals in the complete information setting is computationally easy because the manipulator can enumerate and evaluate all its possible votes (rankings of candidates) in polynomial time [4] . =) (Manipulation by individuals in the complete information setting can be hard for some voting protocols if one allows the number of voters and the number of candidates to be unbounded [2, 1] ). 3. Via prior results [4] , hardness results for manipulation by coalitions in the complete information setting also imply hardness of manipulation by individuals in the incomplete information setting. (V~5~ will discuss these implications in more detail in the conclusions section of this paper.)
3) Are the voters weighted or unweighted? Both of these are important variants, but we focus on weighted voters for the following reasons: 1. In the unweighted case, for any constant number of candidates (even with an unbounded number of voters), manipulation by a coalition in the complete information setting is computationally easy because the coalition can enumerate and evaluate all its 2This assumes that the voting protocol is easy to execute--as most protocols are (including the ones Under study). However, there exist voting protocol s that are NP-hard to execute [3] . effectively different vote vectors [4] . (The nunlber of effectively different vote vectors is polynomial due to the interchangeability of the different equiweighted voters.) 2. Via prior results [4] , hardness results for manipulation by weighted coalitions in the complete information setting also imply hardness of evaluating the probabilities of different outcomes in the incomplete information setting with unweighted (but correlated) voters. (We will discuss these implications in more detail in the conclusions section of this paper.) 4) What is the goal of manipulation? We study two alternative goals: trying to make a given candidate win (we call this constructive manipulation), and trying to make a given candidate not win (we call this destructive manipulation). Besides these goals being elegantly crisp, there are fundamental theoretical reasons to focus on these goals:
First, hardness results for these goals imply hardness of manipulation under any game-theoretic notion of manipulation, because our manipulation goals are always special cases. (This holds both for deterministic and randomized voting protocols.) At one extreme, consider the setting where there is one candidate that would give utility 1 to each of the manipulators, and all other candidates would give utility 0 to each of the manipulators. In this case the only sensible game-theoretic goal for the manipulators is to make the preferred candidate win. This is exactly our notion of constructive manipulation.
At the other extreme, consider the setting where there is one candidate that would give utility 0 to each of the manipulators, and all other candidates would give utility 1 to each of the manipulators. In this case the only sensible game-theoretic goal for the manipulators is to make the hated candidate not win. This is exactly our notion of destructive manipulation.
Second, at least for deterministic voting protocols in the complete information setting, the easiness results transfer from constructive manipulation to any game-theoretic definitions of manipulation that would come down to determining whether the manipulators can make some candidate from a subset of candidates win. For example, one can consider a manipulation successful if it causes some candidate to win that is preferred by each one of the manipulators to the candidate who would win if the manipulators voted truthfully. As another example, one can consider a manipulation successful if it causes some candidate to win that gives a higher sum of utilities to the manipulators than the candidate who would win ff the manipulators voted truthfully. (This definition is especially pertinent if the manipulators can use side payments or some other form of restitution to divide the gains among themselves.) Now, we can solve the problem of determining whether some candidate in a given subset can be made to win simply by determining, for each candidate in the subset in turn, whether that candidate can win. So the complexity exceeds that of constructive manipulation by at most a factor equal to the number of candidates (i.e., a constant).
Third, the complexity of destructive manipulation is directly related to the complexity of determining whether enough votes have been elicited to determine the outcome of the election. Specifically, enough votes have been elicited if there is no way to make the conjectured winner not win by casting the yet unknown votes [5] .
In summary, we focus on coalitional weighted manipulation (cw-manipulation), in the complete information setting. We study both constructive and destructive manipulation. Formally: Definition 1 CONSTRUCTIVE COALITIONAL WEIGHTED (CW)-MANIPULATION. We are given a set of weighted votes S (the nonmanipulators' votes), the weights for a set of votes T which are still open (the manipulators' votes), and a preferred candidate p. For deterministic protocols, we are asked whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that p wins the election. For randomized protocols, we are additionally given a distribution over instantiations of the voting protocol, and a number r, where 0 < r < 1. We are asked whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that p wins with probability greater than r.
Definition 2 DESTRUCTIVE COALITIONAL WEIGHTED (CW)-MANIPULATION. We are given a set off weighted votes S (the nonmanipulators' votes), the weights for a set of votes T which are still open (the manipulators' votes), and a hated candidate h. For deterministic protocols, we are asked whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that h does not win the election. For randomized protocols, we are additionally given a distribution over instantiations of the voting protocol, and a number r, where 0 < r <: 1. We are asked whether there is a way to cast the votes in T so that h wins with probability less than r.
Complexity of manipulation
Now, how many candidates are needed to make an election computationally hard to manipulate? The answer depends on the voting protocol, and whether we are interested in constructive or destructive manipulation. For example, the plurality protocol is easy to manipulate constructively and destructively for any number of candidates [4] . The Borda protocol becomes hard to manipulate constructively with 3 candidates already, but is easy to manipulate destructively for any number of candidates [4] .
The complexity of manipulation with a finite number of candidates has been studied by Conitzer and Sandholm [4] for many of the voting protocols discussed in this paper. However, their focus was on the question of whether or not a protocol is hard to manipulate for some finite number of candidates. For many of the protocols, tlmy did not determine the exact number of candidates at which the polynomial to NP-complete transition occurs. This number is important for evaluating the relative manipulability of different voting protocols (the lower this number, the less manipulable the protocol). In this paper, we determine the exact number of candidates where this transition occurs. We also determine this number for two protocols not addressed by Conitzer and Sandholm: veto and plurality with runoff.
When there are only two candidates, all the protocols are equivalent to the plurality protocol, and hence both types of manipulation (constructive and destructive) are in P for all of the protocols.
The following theorem summarizes the results of Conizer and Sandholm [4] about the complexity of manipulation as the number of candidates exceeds two: In the next subsection, we present our new results on the complexity of constructive manipulation.
In the subsection after that, we lay out our new results on the complexity of destructive manipulation.
N e w results on t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f constructive m a n i p u l a t i o n
We present our hardness results first, followed by our easiness results.
Hardness results
In this section we show hardness results for the two voting protocols for which no hardness results were known before. In many of the proofs of N P-hardness, we use a reduction from the PARTITION problem, which is NP-complete [11] : D e f i n i t i o n 3 PARTITION. We are given a set of integers {ki}l_<i<_t (possibly with multiplicities) summing to 2K, and are asked whether a subset of these integers sums to K. On the other hand, if a manipulation exists, let A be the set of ki corresponding to votes in the manipulation vetoing a, and let B be the set of ki corresponding to votes in the manipulation vetoing b.
Because p is Vetoed by at least 2K -1 of the vote weight, and none of the votes in S veto a, it follows that at least 2K -1 of the vote weight in T vetoes a, that is, ~ 2ki > 2K -1, or ~ ki > K -½. 
Easiness results
We now solve several questions that were left unanswered in [4] . As was shown, CW-CONSTRUCTIVE MANIPULATION In this case, any configuration of votes for T such that p is ranked first for all votes makes p win the election.
Case 2: K > Ds(a,p) and K = Ds(b,p).
It can easily be shown that it is harmless to assume that all votes in T rank p first. Therefore, what remains to be done in order to have p win is to find who in T should vote (p, a, b) and who should vote (p, b, a). What we know so far (before knowing how the votes in T will split between these two profiles)
is: (1) DsuT(p,a) >_ Ds(b, a) . Therefore, we have found that there exists a successful manipulation for p iff K > Ds(b, a) , and in this case a successful manipulation is the one where all voters in the coafition vote (p, a, b).
Case 3: K = Ds(a,p) and K > Ds(b,p).
This is similar to Case 2, switching the roles of a and b; the condition then is K _> Ds(a, b) and the successful manipulation is the one where all vote (p, b, a). Ds(a,p) and K _< Ds(b,p) ).
Here, whatever the votes in T, the Copeland score of p is smaller than or equal to 0 and therefore p cannot be guaranteed to win, so there is no successful manipulation. Thus, in every case, either there is no successful manipulation, or there is a successful manipulation where all manipulators vote identically. • Theorem 5 If the maximin protocol with 3 candidates has a CONSTRUCTIVE CW-MANIPULATION, then it has a CONSTRUCTIVE CW-MANIPULATION where all of the manipulators vote identically. Therefore,
Proof. Let the 3 candidates be p, a, and b. We are given the nonmanipulators' votes S, and the weights for the manipulators' votes T. Let the total vote weight in T be K. Again, it is easy to show that all the manipulators can rank p first without harm.
Let us denote by PK1,K2 a vote configuration for T such that a subset T1 of T, whose cunmlated weight is K1, votes (p, a, b) and T2 ~-T \ T1, whose cumulated weight is K2 (with K1 + K2 ----K), votes (p, b, a). Now all that remains to show is the following: if p wins with the votes in T being PKi,K2 then either p wins with the votes in T being PK,0 or p wins with the votes in T being P0,K-Let us consider these two cases for the outcome of the whole election (including the votes in T):
Case 1: the uniquely worst pairwise election for a is against b, and the uniquely worst pairwise election for b is against a. One of a and b must have got at least half the vote weight in the pairwise election against the other (say, WLOG, a) and therefore have a maximin score of at least half the vote weight.
Since a did even better against p, p received less than half the vote weight in their pairwise election and therefore p does not win. In this section we present our new results on the complexity of destructive manipulation. We first lay out the hardness results, and then the easiness results.
Hardness results
Among the protocols whose complexity has been studied with respect to destructive manipulation, the only unanswered question is the complexity of DESTRUCTIVE CW-MANIPULATION of the STV protocol with 3 candidates. We now determine that complexity. In T, for every ki there is a vote of weight 2k,. We show the instances are equivalent.
We first observe that h will not win if and only if it gets eliminated in the first round: for if it survives the first round, either a or b gets eliminated in the first round. Hence either all the votes in S that ranked a at the top or all those that ranked b at the top will transfer to h, leaving h with at 
Easiness result
While plurality with runoff is hard to manipulate destructively, the other protocol that was not studied before turns out to be easy to manipulate destructively:
Theorem 9 For the veto protocol, DESTRUCTIVE CW-MANIPULATION is in P for any number of candidates.
Proof. Conitzer and Sandholm showed that for protocols in which each candidate gets a numerical score (and the candidate with the highest score wins), and which are monotonic, DESTRUCTIVE CW-MANIPULATION is in P for any number of candidates. [4] (A score-based protocol is monotonic if ranking a candidate higher never decreases that candidate's score.) It is immediate from our definition of the veto protocol that it is a monotonic score-based protocol. •
Conclusions and future research
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Most earlier research on this topic assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded [2, 1] . Such hardness results lose relevance when the number of candidates is small, because manipulation algorithms that are exponential only in the number of candidates might be available. The complexity of manipulating realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant was recently studied [4] , but the emphasis was on the question of whether or not a protocol becomes hard to manipulate for some constant number of candidates. That work, in many cases, left open the question: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? This is a crucial question when comparing the relative manipulability of different voting protocols.
In this paper we answered that question for the voting protocols of the earlier study. We also answered the question for two voting protocols for which no results on the complexity of manipulation had been derived before: veto and plurality with runoff.
The following tables summarize the complexity of constructive and destructive manipulation, respectively, as the state of knowledge stands after this paper. The nontrivial new results of this paper are marked by an asterisk (*).
[ 
Complexity of DESTRUCTIVE CW-MANIPULATION
As in the earlier paper, we studied manipulation by coalitions where the voters are weighted. In this paper we clearly justified why that is a key setting to study, and also layed out the key reasons why our definitions of manipulation are central. Our hardness results also imply hardness for manipulation by individuals when the manipulator is uncertain about the nonmanipulators' votes. 3
Future research includes determining the complexity of destructively manipulating the randomized cup protocol with 3 or more candidates, and designing new voting protocols that are hard to manipulate according to our measure. Finally, 51 P-hardness is a worst-case measure, and it would be desirable to prove that some of the voting protocols are hard to manipulate on average, or to design entirely new voting protocols that are.
